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HIV/AIDS thus can be seen as one of the triggers of Global Health Governance (GHG). At the same time, public health policies and its implementation are still generally perceived to be one of the state's domaine réservées.
Accordingly, this paper endeavours to analyse the relationship between GHG and national health governance in the case of HIV/AIDS. The interest is, first, to assess the impact of GHG on the national level and, second, in the other direction, the influence of national health governance on GHG. This paper will compare Brazil and South Africa as two cases in which the relationship between national politics and GHG has been structured in contrasting ways, ranging from conflict to cooperation. Different reciprocal influences will be analysed through the interface concept formulated by the GHG project group of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) (Hein, Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2006; Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2005; Hein & Kohlmorgen 2003) . Interfaces are defined as "as socio-political spaces of recurrent interactions of collective actors in the handling of transnational and international affairs" (Hein, Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2006: 14) . These forms of interaction can either take conflictive or cooperative forms. A differentiation is made between four kinds of interfaces:
1. "resource-transfer interfaces" denote the exchange of material and immaterial resources. A typical example in the context of a developing country is the provision of development assistance by the World Bank or, bilaterally, by developed countries.
2. "organisational interfaces" stand for formal and informal organisational forms of interaction between different actors. These can be partnerships such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) or non-formalised means of cooperation.
3. "legal interfaces" are defined by the implementation of judiciable norms and standards. Cases before national or international courts as well as formal contracts are the most common form of legal interfaces.
4. "discursive interfaces", finally, characterise the exchange of different ideas and values of actors from the global and the national level (Bartsch & Kohlmorgen 2005: 3) .
GHG actors interacting through the four interfaces are states, international organisations, private business and civil society.
The paired comparative analysis of this paper entails Brazil, a country where the relationship to GHG has been critical cooperative and South Africa, whose interaction with the global level has been conflictive. 2 These different outcomes came about despite significant similarities in the countries' basic conditions. First, both Brazil and South Africa have major HIV/AIDS epidemics. According to Gauri & Lieberman, " important aspects of the epidemic followed a similar initial trajectory in both countries" (2004: 2). In the mid-1980s, a major HIV/AIDS crisis was predicted for both countries. However, Brazil has been able to keep the prevalence rate at 0.7% of the population (UNAIDS 2004: 202) , whereas statistics for South Africa range from 10.4% to 11.8% (Doherty & Colvin 2004: 196) . It is estimated that 660,000
people in Brazil live with HIV; which contrasts with 5.3 million South Africans estimated to be infected by HIV (UNAIDS 2004: 190-191 (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 2-3) , both governments could potentially revert to a similar resource base for fighting the disease. Furthermore, it can be expected that the basic relationship of Brazil and South Africa as middle-income countries to GHG is comparable, whereas it fundamentally differs from least developed countries and from industrialized countries of the "North".
Thus, on two fundamental context variables Brazil and South Africa exhibit commonalities, whereas they differ on the outcome, i.e. their relationship to GHG. The starkest differences in their fight against HIV/AIDS can be seen in respect to the antiretroviral (ARV) treatment of 2 To our knowledge, Gauri and Lieberman (2004) have been the only scholars who have compared Brazil and South Africa in the field of HIV/AIDS policy. They, however, focused on the two countries' response to the epidemic in general and not on the relationship between GHG and national health governance. Accordingly, the comparison in this paper aims at providing new insights on the political mechanisms related to GHG and the national level. 3 Note that due to methodological differences, the Brazilian and South African figures are not completely comparable. 4 Based on income. 5 Based on consumption.
HIV-infected people. The Brazilian government started to rollout ARVs free of charge in 1996; whereas South Africa -reluctantly -only started in 2003, eight years later. 6 This two-N comparison will thus provide insights on the influence of GHG on national HIV/AIDS governance and vice versa.
The qualitative comparison rests on a wide range of primary and secondary sources as its empirical base. We conducted 48 interviews in South Africa and 68 in Brazil 7 , with respondents coming from governments, international organisations, the private business sector, civil society organisations, the medical and the scientific sector. The analysis in this paper evolves along the four interface-types set out above, i.e. resource-transfer, organisational, legal and discursive. On the basis of the analysis along the four interface types the concluding chapter unravels the conflict and cooperation between national health governance and GHG in the fight of HIV/AIDS in Brazil and South Africa.
Resource-transfer Interfaces: Different Degrees of Autonomy from the Global Level
This study operationalises resource-transfer interfaces through external financial support for national health governance in the sphere of fighting HIV/AIDS. Resources can come from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies as well as from private foundations. They might direct their funds to state organisations or to the civil society.
In 1982, the year in which the first case of AIDS was made public in Brazil, the country also became heavily affected by the Latin American debt crisis (Baer & Paiva 1996: 67-8, 71 ; for an overview see Sangmeister 1992: 255-6 ). 8 Only with a debt restructuring agreement and the issuing of federal bonds the severe financial crisis was resolved in 1994 (Calcagnotto 1985: 63-74; Vazquez 1996: 5; Fritz 2002: 132-134; Tesouro Nacional 2006: 1-2) . Thus, at least until the mid-1990s, Brazil had been reliant on resource-transfer interfaces for funding from the global level. 6 The South African government has for a long time fiercely resisted the rolling-out of antiretrovirals (ARV) in public hospitals for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission (MTCT) of the HI virus and for treating HIVinfected people. Recent media reports suggest that despite the 2003 decision to provide ARVs the conflict over the treatment of HIV/AIDS in South Africa is not over. Parallel to the general controversy about structural adjustment (Elmendorf & Roseberry 1993: 123; Lurie et al. 1995: 539-546 Since 1983 already, advocacy groups of homosexual men from São Paulo had fiercely fought for a response to HIV/AIDS following the same principles of universal access which characterised the Unified Health System. In turn, São Paulo became the pioneer of an integrated concept of HIV/AIDS care and prevention as a matter of peoples' right to health (Teixeira 1997: 46) . This strategy also formed the basis of the first Brazilian AIDS Programme which was established in 1985 (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 18) . However, although it would have conceptually been "a very proper vehicle for comprehensive management of HIV" (Berkman et al. 2005 (Berkman et al. : 1166 , the Unified Health System still being in its infancy could not cope with the quickly mounting HIV/AIDS epidemic.
The universal provision of treatment against opportunistic diseases (since 1988), of the antiretroviral drug AZT (since 1991) and of the antiretroviral combination therapy HAART 9 (since 1996) free of charge through the national government (Galvão 2002: 214) had subsequently increased the gap between rapidly growing needs for treatment and Brazil's scarce financial resources. Calculations from 1989 estimated the direct treatment costs for each AIDS patient to be approximately US$ 15,670 per year, with total costs forecasted to amount to around US$ 3.5 billion for the treatment of all known AIDS patients in Brazil (Medici 1994: 328) . 10 Accordingly, external financing for the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) had become a necessity in the beginning 1990s.
In 1992, the Brazilian government was finally willing "to seek for" as the World Bank termed it (2005b: 11), or "to accept a financial help initiative offered as a long-term credit by the World Bank" (Galvão 2000: 140 , emphasis by the authors). Since the conclusion of the loan agreement in 1994, it has been the multilateral institution that provides the highest external resource for the Brazilian health sector. Indeed, the World Bank has been "the earliest [exter-
nal donor] to become involved in a major way " (2005b: 26) . Through the loans AIDS I (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and AIDS II (1998 the institution made available credit facilities with a total of US$ 325 million for prevention activities, epidemiological surveillance and capacity building.
The Brazilian government's own contribution to the projects has been US$ 225 million. The third programme, AIDS III (2003 III ( -2006 , has a total volume of US$ 200 million, with 50%
financed by each partner respectively (World Bank 2004: 7-9; World Bank 2005b: 14-15, 20-21, 25) The financial contribution of other external donors has not gone beyond 10% of overall external resources (US$ 278 million for 1992-1997) (Fontes 1999: 96-7) .
Resource-transfer interfaces have also been strongly used by NGOs working in the field of HIV/AIDS. Before the World Bank started to provide funds to NGOs in 1994, financing from private foundations such as the Ford Foundation had been of "fundamental" importance for the pioneer NGOs ABIA, GAPA, and Pela VIDDA 11 (Galvão 2000: 134) . Today, their main revenue sources are internal as well as external. In a recent survey of 328 HIV/AIDS civil society organisations, the greatest group stated to receive funds through "agreements with public bodies" (78%) and "donation by individuals" (72.6%). However, 40.9% also draw on support from an "international cooperation agency" (Castro & Silva 2005: 157) .
In conclusion, Brazil has extensively used resource-transfer interfaces in relating to GHG.
Since the World Bank loans were issued in 1993, the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) to a large extent has been funded by external sources. Furthermore, the civil society organisations working on HIV/AIDS have also drawn on revenue sources from the global level.
In contrast, South Africa's fight against HIV/AIDS was hardly directly influenced via financial contributions from the global level -that is resource-transfer interfaces. According to Schneider & Gilson (1999: 266) total international aid to the health sector had just been over 1% of the South African annual government health budget in the period 1994 until 1999 and did not rise thereafter. As a middle-income country which has not been severely indebted 12 , South Africa has not been reliant on conditional donor aid. 13 Neither the Apartheid govern-11 GAPA is the abbreviation for Grupo de Apoio à Prevenção à AIDS (AIDS-Prevention Promotion Group); Grupo Pela VIDDA stands for Grupo Pela Valorização, Integração e Dignidade do Doente de Aids (Group for Appreciation, Integration and Dignity of AIDS Patients). 12 In 1996, shortly after the democratic transition, South Africa's total external debt amounted to US$ 23.6 billion (World Bank 1998: 249) . 13 Accordingly, this position stands in clear contrast to Brazil. ment nor, since the democratic transformation in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) government have extensively drawn on external resources for financing public health policies. 14 In correspondence to its favourable financial position, the ANC-government thus has refused offers of financial or technical aid which it found not fitting into its policy framework, "particularly from the World Bank" ( Direct resource-transfers to South Africa's HIV/AIDS programme have been low. The prime reason has been the ANC-government's resilience to preserve its national sovereignty. The status as a middle-income country with insignificant external debt has allowed the government to refuse external aid. There has been, however, strong interaction through resourcetransfer interfaces between South Africa's NGOs and the global level. In respect to these actors, the influence of GHG on national health governance can be perceived to be strong.
Organisational Interfaces: Important Indicator for Conflict and Cooperation
In this study, organisational interfaces are defined as entities, which are formed by at least two consenting actors from GHG and national health governance. The use of organisational interfaces therefore acts as a crucial indicator for the degree of cooperation between the national and the global level.
Since 1980, the World Health Organization (WHO), through its regional representative Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), has developed multiple initiatives with Brazilian health authorities and academic institutions. These joint activities by means of organisational interfaces laid the conceptual basis for the reform of Brazilian health system in the 1980s and 17 Some commentators even describe the TAC as "one of South Africa's most effective and active" groups in the whole NGO sector (Mail & Guardian 2003; see also Willan 2004: 114) . 18 The full list of donors along with a detailed analysis can be found in Mbali (2005: 22-23 1990s. As outlined above, this in turn shaped the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Programme (BSAP) (Lima 2002: 92-93; Fontes 1999: 113-114 holders were allowed to and indeed did charge monopoly prices. As a consequence, the Brazilian authorities in the early 2000s had negotiated with a number of pharmaceutical MNCs in 25 These were for instance electronic, pharmaceutical and chemical products, as well as paper and cellulose. 26 "Compulsory licensing is generally defined as the granting of a license to a third-party by a government to use a patent without the permission of the patent holder" (Kühl 2002: 17). order to obtain cheaper prices for the ARV cocktail (Oliveira & Esher 2004: 244-245; Wogart & Calcagnotto 2006: 96 28 The lawsuit, which was based on the legal provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, was supported by the United States government, which threatened to impose trade restrictions on South Africa (Lanoszka 2003: 191-192) .
It aimed at the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, signed by President Mandela in December 1997, which gave the South African Minister of Health the power to allow both compulsory licensing and parallel importation 29 of patented medicines, in this case particularly antiretroviral drugs (Kühl 2002: 76) . Responding to intense national and international public pressure and with only slim chances to win the case, the 39 pharmaceutical MNCs represented by the PMA backtracked from the case in late 1998 (Weissman 2001) . 27 The domestic production of the drugs Nevirapine and Indinavir in 2000 represented savings of US$ 80 million, or 30% of the overall ARV-expenditures in that year (Marques 2002: 69) . As a consequence of price reductions and local production of non patented ARVs, US$ 960 million were saved between 1996 and 2002 (Oliveira & Esher 2004: 245) . 28 See particularly paragraph 2.4 of the complaint with the High Court (PMA 1998). Extensive documentation of the case can be found on the web page of the American NGO CPtech (http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/). 29 "Parallel importation refers to the imports of goods purchased in a foreign market by an independent third party and later resold in the domestic market where much lower prices compete with the prices charged by authorized distributors" (Kühl 2002: 18) .
However, in January 2001 the lawsuit was reinstated. The chances for a victory of the pharmaceutical manufacturers were considerably better because South Africa was now obliged to fully comply with the requirements of the TRIPS Agreement (Kühl 2002: 76 The pharmaceutical industry, fearing another public relations nightmare, finally withdrew the lawsuit in mid-April 2001 (Lanoszka 2003: 192) and agreed to "a settlement almost on the government of South Africa's terms. The only concession made by the government was to comply with decisions made by the World Trade Organizations on TRIPS" (Kühl 2002: 78) .
Therefore, the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act from 1997 remained largely unchanged. In conjunction with strong public pressure from discursive interfaces used, the legal challenge was averted. However, the government rejected proposals from civil society to declare the HIV/AIDS epidemic a national emergency. 30 The Doha Declaration explicitly permits countries to issue compulsory licences in case of national health emergencies (Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 26) . 27). 30 In fact, the obvious contradiction between the South African government claiming that antiretrovirals are too expensive and not using its legal provisions to lower the prices remains puzzling. One common explanation given from respondents in South Africa has been that the ANC-government does not perceive the HIV/AIDS epidemic to be a national emergency. One MP from the ruling party and member of SANAC maintained that "we are not running in a crisis mode." For the World Bank, drug distribution without charging patients has not constituted a policy to be recommended, since the institution focussed on the cost effectiveness of public health programmes (1997: 3). Nevertheless, these differences on the discursive level did not impede the concession of the AIDS I-III loans, because both sides "agreed to disagree" (World Bank 2005b: 13). Brazil's comprehensive approach could be implemented, whereas the World Bank invested in improving the cost effectiveness of HIV/AIDS prevention, surveillance and in building public health institutions. The disagreement on discursive aspects did thus not prevent an agreement about financial cooperation.
HIV/AIDS workplace programmes may also be considered to influence through discursive interfaces, since they raise awareness for the epidemic, inform about prevention and demonstrate the effectiveness of ARV treatment. In Brazil, workplace programmes for prevention and awareness have been implemented since 1985, with large national and multinational companies taking the lead. Bank conglomerates (e.g. Itaú since 1987), state owned companies (e.g. the power utility Furnas since 1992) and MNCs such as Ford have implemented HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention programmes from early on (Terto 1997: 142, 152; Teixeira 1997: 60-61) . NGOs such as ABIA and GAPA as well as immunology centres, which never had any direct contact to the business sector before, have provided technical input to companies' HIV/AIDS workplace programmes (Terto 1997: 152) .
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Established in 1998, the Brazilian National Business AIDS Council (CEN) has been the body representing business at the Brazilian Sexually Transmitted Diseases/AIDS Programme (BSAP). It furthermore has exerted an important global diffusion function in disseminating best practices in respect to workplace programmes (Terto 1997: 154) . The result of these do-mestic and multilateral activities has been a change in mentality. Firms and private founda- (Mbali 2005: 36) . In its campaign tactics, TAC has learnt from the US-based NGO AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT-UP) (Schneider 2001: 18) . This gives further evidence to the strong interaction of NGO actors from the national and the global level through discursive interfaces.
In contrast, scholars have described the reaction of MNCs which operate in South Africa towards the HIV/AIDS epidemic as reluctant and weak (Dickinson 2004: 628; Connely & Rosen 2005 : 1925 . It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain both countries' domestic policy processes but other research suggests that the decentralised nature of Brazil's political system, the more dispersed party landscape and -particularly -its coherent "national political community" incorporating all ethnicities explains much of the country's more aggressive and coherent fight against HIV/AIDS compared to South Africa (e.g. Gauri & Lieberman 2004: 30-32) . In contrast, South Africa's HIV/AIDS policy has for a long time been dominated by the central ANC-government which could push through its strict refusal to provide ARVs in the public health system. Accordingly the South African government had no interest in cooperation with GHG actors over the question of HIV/AIDS treatment and rarely entered into organisational or resource-transfer interfaces. As the dominating political actor on that national level the ANC-government severely diminished the scope for GHG influence.
Because of the conflictive relationship with GHG, discursive interfaces -with multinational NGOs and businesses for example successfully administering highly visible antiretroviral treatment programmes -became the main routes of influence in South Africa. Conversely, and somewhat paradoxically, the influence of discursive interfaces on Brazil's fight against HIV/AIDS has been lower, despite funding from the World Bank which pursued another policy. As the analysis has shown, the Bank has not been able to push through its model of how to fight HIV/AIDS. Brazil has refused to charge HIV-infected people for ARV treatment and created a much acclaimed multidimensional range of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment activities which became known as the "Brazilian model" (Parker 2003: 144) . The main reason has been the consent that had emerged on the adequate fight against HIV/AIDS among Brazilian actors from the state, civil society and business.
The analysis points to the fact that the relationship between the different interfaces is highly context-specific. On the one hand, the World Bank example has shown that interfaces can work incongruently, i.e. that accordance between national health governance and GHG actors 35 Despite the fact that South Africa has -in contrast to Brazil -not heavily been indebted it seems reasonable to argue that its fight against HIV/AIDS would also have been strengthened by the acceptance of external funds.
is found in respect to one interface but not in respect to an other. In Brazil's case, the resource-transfer interface was used but GHG-influence through discursive interfaces was limited. On the other hand, interfaces can work in congruence with one another. For instance, resource-transfer implications clearly stood at the basis of the South African government's decision to mould the South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) along the "organisational template" (Putzel 2004 : 1130) of a country-coordinating mechanism required by the Global Fund.
Not only had GHG (some) influence on national health governance, but the national experiences and politics of Brazil and South Africa also exerted an important impact on GHG. In this direction, discursive interfaces also proved to be of crucial significance. As outlined above, Brazil has acted as a global role model for the fight against HIV/AIDS, with "perhaps the most successful experience yet realized in any developing country, but perhaps anywhere" (Parker 2003: 144) . ARVs there has thus been the biggest coherence between Brazil and South Africa. By using discursive and legal interfaces both governments have pursued confrontational strategies against MNCs in order to influence GHG.
On the whole, besides using legal and discursive interfaces in the quest for affordable ARVs, Brazil and South Africa have entered into contrasting relationships to GHG. Due to the comparably high degree of autonomy of both Brazil and South Africa, the fundamental determinants for conflict and cooperation with GHG can predominately be found in the realms of the state. Central actors such as the South African government can cause a conflictive relationship 36 The threat gained credibility from the fact that Brazil as a middle-income country has had the laboratory facilities and the industrial capacities to produce generic drugs. The same holds true for South Africa.
to GHG and can limit its influence. In Brazil, this dominating actor with a negative predisposition towards HIV/AIDS treatment and national-global interaction in this area has been absent.
